

NCRP Scientific Committee 2-2

Tentative Agenda

October 29-30, 2007

Monday, October 29, 2007

8:30 AM	Call to Order	(Poston)
8:40 AM	Introductions	(All)
9:00 AM	NCRP Welcome and Charge to the Committee	(Tenforde)
9:30 AM	Consideration of Agenda	(All)
9:45 AM	Review of Related Activities in the Federal Government and States	(Buddemeier, Jones, Taylor & McBaugh)
10:45 AM	BREAK	
11:00 AM	General discussion of scope and content of the report	
12 noon	Lunch at NCRP	
1:15 PM	Define the primary audience for the report	
2:00 PM	Develop outline of the report	
3:15 PM	BREAK	
3:45 PM	Develop outline of the report	
5:00 PM	Adjourn	

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

8:30 AM	Reconvene Scientific Committee	
8:35 AM	Reconsideration of progress from yesterday	
9:00 AM	Agree on initial writing assignments	
10:00 AM	Develop schedule for completion of initial draft	
11:00 AM	Develop schedule for future meetings and conference calls	
12 noon	Lunch at NCRP	
1:15 PM	Final summary and Adjournment	

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NCRP Scientific Committee 2-2 (SC 2-2) Meeting at NCRP Headquarters, October 29, 2007

Introduction of participants

John Poston, Chair
Tammy Taylor
Ed Leidholdt
Cyndi Jones
John Lanza
Brooke Buddemeier
Robert Ingram
Steve Musolino
Abel Gonzalez
Kathleen Kaufman
Debra McBaugh
Jerry Bushberg, Consultant
Ken Groves, Technical Staff Consultant
Tom Tenforde, President, NCRP

OVERVIEW AND INPUT FROM SC 2-2

Tom Tenforde

- Overall review/roster for review/housekeeping/conflict of Interest issue
- policy on dissemination of committee working materials/can talk with colleagues (with conditions)
- Draft report ultimately goes to NCRP committee and the public for comments/important and timely (past due)
- Started in 2005 with DHS/long-term process including preparation of RFP. (30 month project—4 meetings)
- Overview of NCRP Report 138 and Commentary 19 (John Poston has a tutorial on the NCRP website)
- Recent NCRP work on: backscatter x-ray review/Pulse fast-neutron review/LINAC for package review (pair-production at different energies)-dose less than 5 mSv for exposed individuals
- Other reports proposed to DHS--FEDs believe RAD/NUC terrorism presents a “credible threat”
- Went over NCRP review process/22 months to council/final editorial review and revisions with report finalized in 30 months

Goals for first meeting:

- Tom’s thoughts
- 2-2 report: refine the scope
- Define sequence of events--port has an rad alarm to total response

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- Relate 2-2 report to other docs
- Ensure IAEA compatibility
- FTP site (secure website to exchange info—see handout)
- Technical Staff Consultant and Laura will act as clearinghouse for addition info

Consideration of Agenda

Review of Federal Programs

Brooke –A copy of Brooke’s presentation is on the SC 2-2 website

Debra-oral presentation (mainly TOPOFF-IV)

- Be able to explain how there were “no plumes”, i.e., you have a “footprint” as materials fall out very quickly.
- As SME you need to provide the explanation to city/local/state officials (issue of plume vs footprint)
- AOC (state agencies) vs. CP—confusing/
- Self-evacuation and worried-well/
- Be able to answer questions and use that as a vehicle to address “the few key points”—reiteration of central issues/
- RDD—sheltering issue/AZ vs Portland/
- How to address “impact of effects” between states/countries/
- “fog of battle” and how you can make poor decisions under stress (generate check list/canned answers to address basic issues)
- JIC issues-not established for 2 days-and they (exercise participants) knew the exercise was coming
- The ability to get help from other states (or any entity) was cumbersome

Tammy (OSTP)

- Has challenge to produce “roadmap” for R&D and solutions
- Through review of PAG process--there is recognition that the current ones are not effective for INDs—the lead will be OSTP

Cyndi (NRC)

- DHS plans to finalize PAGs and impact on emergency responders early next year—There will be separate guidance regarding incidents developed later for INDs .
- Measurements are key info early on
- TOPOFF-IV in Portland—no DHS presence, but 7-9 TOCs/EOCs, etc.
- Dynamics were “interesting” (Gov MD vs City MD with lawyers) to determine who was in charge
- Logistics of how to communicate during incidents--text messaging rather than cell phone calls
- Energy Policy Act of 2005--communications strategy needs to be developed—sub-report on communications to be issued by end of year, includes education

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needs. (Cyndi will also forward August 06 Report to the President to the SC 2-2 website)

- First responders had the problem of which EOC was really in charge
- No unified command per NIMS/should critical decision makers be at one place-?
- Review RAD/NUC annex to NRP for Federal Agency Responsibilities
- Advisory team was not called by FRMAC; state & city did not adequately use the Advisory Team for development of the PARs.
- Concerns with referring to the PAGs as “limits” rather than recommendations.
- There is consensus on DHS PAGs since Jan 2006— (Tom T. input) NCRP has offered to coordinate the optimization strategy for EPA PAGs—support from CRCPD might be helpful (see NCRP Report 146)—RDD vs IND issues. Once OSTP initiates IND PAG effort next month, there may be differences in the PAGs.

Abel

- International points of reflection
- Hierarchy approach/response: look at number of agencies involved in U.S. This can jeopardize a clear hierarchical chain of command. Also see “planned response vs where expertise resides” issue
- ICRP recommends sheltering as key; but other options are considered in actual event (see ICRP Publication on Radiation Protection in the event of terrorist attack)
- Where does media fit in?
- Need to include sabotage of a nuclear facility in with RDD and IND PAG issue
- Peer review of our report vs what has actually happened in practice (real events) is important to do
- Address *de jure* “legally binding undertakings by the US Government” –two conventions are in existence: the Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention. But they were adopted for accidents at a time when terrorism was not an issue—issue of applicability to terrorist events.
- Address *de facto* international duties: code of conduct and guidance on export and import are examples
- Address international consensus on health effects: UNSCEAR report (new, not published yet) reconfirm “nominal risk factors” that are still valid;
- Address international consensus on radiation protection: for instance ICRP recommendations on “terrorist-related” protection; on defining the critical group(s), on optimization, etc (Ken will see what is in the ICRP reports)
- Issue of exclusion (by legislators) from the law and exemption (by regulators) from some regulatory requirements. Exclusion is linked to unamenability of control; exemption is linked to unwarranted control. (see new ICRP recommendations)
- Address implications of the Codex Alimentarius for food stuffs, (also WHO drinking water guidance and IAEA guidance on non-edible commodities)

John’s Summary of the issues that came out of the above discussions:

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- Multiple jurisdictions—how to deal with
- Multiple events (different decision process)
- Assistance from other entities
- Delegation of authority
- Communications (all issues)
- Command Centers—how many and where
- PAGs for all events including clean-up
- Hierarchy of planning and response (separate)
- Decision “aiding” and decision “making”
- Response may be different depending on event (radiation exposure device where does the material go)
- Legal vs de facto basis for decisions
- UNSCEAR and ICRP reports
- Exclusion vs exemption issues
- Contamination of food commodities
- Chem.-bio vs radiation and level of PPE and Treatment of injured as a priority
- Ensure that events (fire and contamination) are prioritized
- Establish appropriate reception centers

Jerry

- Assure that key elements of response guidance (i.e., treat critically injured patients without regard to contamination) is reflected in local response agency SOPs and training.
- Establish reception centers than can treat minor injuries, perform personnel decontamination, and deal with radiation exposure concerns of the populations who may be affected by the event.

Brooke

- What can we do and what do we know—need to better understand our strengths and avoid areas out of our core competencies.
- Need homework for the SC 2-2 members to get up to the level of understanding the issues
- Recommend setting up briefings of current work that is relevant to our report

Ed

- Report should to address all terrorist-related rad/nuc events; not just RDDs and INDs (which are similar and which are unique), and include research reactors and any sabotage of nuc/rad facility—long and valuable discussion followed. Bottom line: exempt commercial nuclear power, DOE and DoD terrorist events from the Report as they have in place agreements to handle. This report may still provide some valuable insights.
- It may not be obvious at the beginning that a terrorist caused the event.

Bob

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- Refer to appropriate NIMS (National Incident Management System) documents; and keep the report scientific/technical related. Use format of Commentary 19 to emphasize what is important in each chapter—key issues up front

General Discussion Agenda Items

- Broader set of recommendations for “bigger picture” and for longer period of time- (early) guidance is critical, but intermediate phase is also important
- What is the definition of “aftermath”? Includes restoration and post-incident land use, etc. The time is a continuum.
- “Critical issues” and key decision aids needed by decision makers to decide and initiate.”
- Decision “aiding” is important concept and can use input from the scientific community and then use input from the stakeholder community in the “decision making” effort (need input from stakeholders indirectly early on, but not formal)
- Aftermath=(early, intermediate, long-term)

Audience Issue Discussion

- Standards for Incident commander and “down” (Tammy discussed) “General RDD”—ATSM (linked to international organizations) document coming from Tammy for us to review—the context is for who the audience may be for our report

Abel

- Need to describe what facilities are included in the scope of this report—terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant, nuclear plant sabotage, research reactors, etc. While core issues are the same—maybe-?
- Need to exclude commercial power reactors, DOE/DoD facilities. In so doing, we do not want to leave the impression that these facilities are not an issue that has necessarily been resolved. This Report is additional guidance that can be used if needed/wanted.

Reviewed Outline

- May be useful in both pre-event planning and operational usefulness—current outline may be in reverse order
- Separate sections on IND and RDD response, even if repetitive (still have a comprehensive Executive Summary as well as a summary/conclusions chapter)
- Introduction/scope are important to set the stage

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- Need to address preparedness and action plan for each section (RDD and IND) and the early, intermediate and late phase issues

Brooke's proposal: see revised work plan where current section 3 is removed and used as the basis for addressing issues in both the planning and "response" portions

Steve's comments on non-covered events (DOE/DoD and Commercial Nuclear Power)-- Issue of Late Phase and Scope of report. Report still applicable—issue to be resolved (someday) do say what the report does cover or what is excluded (or both) to clarify for the reader

What do we need:

- Status of both NCRP reports on individual decontamination and public decontamination with scaling factors—Jerry/Tom T. will provide

Adjourn Day two of SC 2-2 meeting